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Randall: Evidence

EVIDENCE
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*

HEARSAY

Watson v. Wall' was an action for partition of a tract of
land, brought by the administrator c.t.a. of the estate of S. J.
Wall. The executrix of the estate of W. Furman Wall, the
brother of S. J. Wall, was permitted to intervene as a defendant. The intervenor took the position that Furman had
conveyed his one-sixth interest in the tract to S. J. Wall while
Furman was mentally incompetent, and that the deed had
been obtained by fraud and for a grossly inadequate consideration. The answer prayed that the deed be set aside upon
tender of the purchase price. A special referee found for
the intervenor-defendant, but the circuit judge held that the
evidence was insufficient to establish fraud or undue influence
and dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed. On
appeal, the intervenor objected inter alia to the admission in
evidence of a statement of a since-deceased doctor to the effect
that Furman was mentally and physically capable of executing
any legal papers. This statement had been sent to S. J. Wall
by Furman, after a lengthy exchange of correspondence between the brothers, during which S. J. urged Furman not to
sell, and Furman insisted that he needed the money for a
business transaction. Finally, S. J. had written his brother,
"If you still persist in selling your interest if you will get
a statement from some reputable doctor that you are physically
and mentally able to make a title to real estate, I will try and
borrow the money and give you $600.00 for your part of the
plantation. ' 2 Furman answered, enclosing the requested statement, from one Dr. Zimmerman.
Defendant objected to admission of this statement on the
ground that the doctor (deceased at the time of trial) was not
available for cross-examination. The special referee held it
admissible. The Supreme Court found it doubtful that defendant had preserved this question for appeal, but found
no error in the admission in evidence of the doctor's state"Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 239 S. C.109, 121 S. E. 2d 427 (1961).
2. 239 S. C. 117, 121 S. E. 2d 431 (1961).
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ment. No question of authenticity was raised; the only issue
was that of hearsay. The Court held in effect that the statement was not hearsay on the issue of whether S. J. Wall's
conduct in the transaction was fraudulent. This would appear
clearly correct, since on this issue, the truth of the matter
stated in the certificate would not be essential to its probative
force. As to admissibility of the certificate on the other issue,
whether Furman was in fact competent, the Court held that
other evidence in the record clearly indicated that Furman
Wall had sufficient capacity to understand the transaction,
so that even if the certificate had been admitted for use in
determining this issue, the error was harmless.
Admissions
3

State v. Davis was an indictment of a white member of the
Marine Corps for rape of a Negress. At the trial, one Sergeant Hartley, who had been on shore patrol duty on the night
in question, testified that defendant had come running up to
him and said that two colored boys were pursuing him. The
colored boys then came running up, the Sergeant testified, and
told him that defendant had "thrown a colored woman down
in the bushes." Defendant then had flatly denied the charge.
The Supreme Court held that admission of these statements
was prejudicial error, and reversed a conviction, on this and
other grounds. Since defendant had denied the charge, no
basis for estoppel or admission by conduct arose, and the
statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. In State v.
Sharpe 4 a conviction of a Negro for rape of a white woman,
a similar question arose, in which, however, the requisites for
admissibility as an admission were found to exist. While defendant was in jail, his mother came to him and said, "Israel,
as many colored women as it is in this town why in the world
did you go and get messed up with a white woman and you
will just have to pay your penalty." 5 Defendant made no
reply. Defendant objected to admission of this statement at
the trial, alleging that he was not present when it was made.
The record showed otherwise, and the Supreme Court held
that the statement was properly admitted, since defendant
heard it and remained silent.
3. 239 S. 0. 280, 122 S. E. 2d 633 (1961).
4. 239 S. C. 258, 122 S. E. ?d 622 (1961).
5. 239 S. C. 271, 122 S. E. 2d 628 (1961).
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Res Gestae-Contemporaneous Utterances
Van Boven v. F. W. Woolworth Co.0 was an action for
damages by a customer of the store, who alleged that she
tripped and fell over a section of low wire fencing left in an
aisle of the "garden shop" of defendant's store. After falling,
the plaintiff hobbled back into the store and found an employee to whom she told her story and showed her torn hose.
The employee called her supervisor, and said to the latter,
"..... this is the lady that fell outside the flower bed where
they had been working." The Supreme Court held that admission of this statement was proper, under the res gestae
rule,7 Mr. Justice Moss pointing out that the statement need
not be precisely concurrent in point of time with the act, but
that it was enough if the statement was contemporaneous
with the main fact. The Court distinguished the McLellan
Stores case," in which testimony of a witness to the effect that
five seconds after plaintiff's fall in that case, some unknown
elderly lady had stated that "The floor has just been oiled
and she fell," was held not within the res gestae rule.
McClure v. Price9 involved a collision between an automobile and a tractor-trailer. A small barber shop was located
at the small intersection where the accident occurred. A
barber named McDowell was called as a witness for the
defense, and testified that he had been looking out of the
window and saw the collision. He testified that a fellow
barber, one Thomas, had seen the plaintiff's car approaching
the intersection, and had exclaimed, "The dern fool is going
to kill himself." Upon objection, the trial judge excluded
this statement, and directed the jury to disregard it. Defendants contended that it was admissible as res gestae. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, upheld exclusion on the
ground that Thomas had been called as a witness for defense,
and at no time did he say that he saw the plaintiff's car
before the collision. The Court does not set out its reasoning,
and may have felt that no prejudice arose from exclusion.
It would seem that if counsel considered the point important,
6. 239 S. C. 519, 123 S. E. 2d 862 (1962).
7. This rule embraces a broad range of hearsay exceptions, including
declarations of present bodily condition, declarations of present mental
state or emotion, excited utterances and declarations of present sense impressions. Wabisky v. D. C. Transit System, Inc., 309 F. 2d 317 (D. C. Cir.
1962); MCCORMICK oN EVDENCE, §§ 265-274

(1954).

S. Bagwell v. McLellan Stores Co., 216 S. C. 207, 57 S. E. 2d 257 (1949).
9. 300 F. 2d 538 (4 Cir. 1962).
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he would have questioned Thomas specifically thereon, refreshing his recollection if necessary, and perhaps even laying
.a foundation for admission of the statement as impeachment
of his own witness.' 0 However, as a matter of principle, the
statement would seem clearly to qualify within the res gestae
rule, and the fact that the declarant Thomas did not so testify
at the trial would not seem to affect the result; a party is
free to introduce testimony which contradicts that of his own
witness.'.

Official Records
Edwards v. Edwards.2 was an action by plaintiff seeking to
lhave himself declared the natural child of William S. Edwards, and therefore an heir of James M. Edwards. At the
trial, at which plaintiff received a verdict and judgment in
his favor, the trial court admitted into evidence information
relevant to plaintiff's parentage, and contained in the U. S.
Official Census returns for 1920. Plaintiff introduced a
certificate 3 stating that in that return, the names of Will
Edwards and his wife, as husband and wife, and Waites
Edwards, the plaintiff, and 3 other sons, were set out. The
census listed the children all as "sons." Defendants in the
instant case included the other listed sons, and introduction
,of the report into evidence was opposed on the ground that
it would violate the pertinent Federal statute.' 4 The Court
pointed out that the principal probative use of the information
.at the trial would be to establish the relation of plaintiff to
Will Edwards, and that the relationship of the other children
was undisputed and not before the Court. The Court held that
the word "detriment" in the statute did not mean detriment
in the sense of a financial loss flowing from establishing the
truth in court, and that defendants suffered no detriment
within the contemplation of the Act.
CONFESSIONS

The formal requirements for admission into evidence of
a confession are outlined by Mr. Justice Moss in State v.
10. Presumably counsel would have to show surprise from the unexpected
testimony of his own witness to do this. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 38,
pp. 72-73 (1954), and cases cited.
11. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 47 (1954). Clearly, the testimony is
on a material, not a collateral, fact in the instant case.
12. 239 S. C. 85, 121 S. E. 2d 432 (1961).
13. Pursuant to 13 U. S. C. A. § 8(a).

14. 13 U. S. C. A. § 8(c) provides: "In no case shall information

furnished under the authority of this section be used to the detriment

,of the persons to whom such information relates."
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Worthy.' 5 Defendant claimed that his confession was not
voluntarily made and was made while he was intoxicated.
Since the record contained ample evidence that this was not
so, and since defendant offered no evidence at the trial to
controvert the evidence offered by the solicitor, the Court held
that admission of the confession was proper in the circumstances, although the conviction was reversed on other
grounds. In State v. Young,:' the Supreme Court held that
questions relating to the circumstances surrounding the taking
of a confession were proper in connection with its admission
into evidence, and that the fact that the confession was
taken down by a person apparently not experienced in such
matters, so that the words of the arresting officer and the
answers thereto by the defendant were not separated, caused
no confusion or prejudice in the circumstances. The confession was held properly admitted in evidence, in an opinion
by the Chief Justice.
In State v. Robinson 7 the trial judge conducted the preliminary examination as to the voluntariness of an alleged
confession of defendant, in the presence of the jury, a practice
which the Supreme Court has often criticized. The Court's
view of what constitutes the better practice, as set out in
the Chasteen case,' 8 was particularly vindicated in the instant case, where after strenuous objection by defendant
the solicitor withdrew the offered confession, and the trial
judge instructed the jury to "wipe it from your minds."
However, the Supreme Court found that other evidence of
defendant's guilt was almost overwhelming, and that counsel
for defendant had not objected to conducting the preliminary
examination in the presence of the jury. On these considerations, the Court refused to reverse the conviction.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

Burden of Persuasion-"Clearand Convincing Evidence.'"
In Watson v. Wall19 the intervening defendant asserted that
decedent W. Furman Wall had transferred his interest in the
land while mentally incompetent, and that the deed had been
obtained by fraud, duress and undue influence. Hence, he
15.
16.
17.
18.

239
238
238
228

S.
S.
S.
S.

C.
C.
C.
C.

449, 123 S. E. 2d 835 (1962).
115, 119 S. E. 2d 504 (1961).
140, 121 S. E. 2d 432 (1961).
88, 88 S. E. 2d 880 (1955).

19. Supra note 1.
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assumed the burden of proving this allegation by "clear,
cogent and convincing evidence. ' 20
The special referee
found that the defendant had carried this burden, and recommended that the deed be set aside. The case then came to the
circuit judge, who disagreed with the conclusion of the
special referee, and held that the evidence was insufficient
to establish fraud or undue inflx1ence. No indication is given
in the report of the case as to what standard of persuasion
was applied by the circuit judge, nor as to what standard
would be proper. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that
since the issues were equitable, "the lower court's factual
findings are subject to review on appeal, and may be reversed if in our opinion they are contrary to the preponderance
of the evidence," citing Simonds v. Simonds,2 1 with the
burden of convincing the appellate court resting on the
appellant. Thus South Carolina seems committed to the
orthodox view that the test to be applied by the appellate
court in these cases in which the burden below is by "clear,
cogent and convincing evidence" is simply the preponderance
of the evidence test. Dean McCormick discusses the two views,
22
without taking sides as to which is the better.
Burden of Producing Evidence and Presumptions
Packer v. Corbett Canning Co. 23 was a workmen's compensation case. The employee was found dead at about 7 a.m.
at his employer's place of business, his duties requiring his
presence as night watchman from 9:30 p.m. to 6 a.m. There
had been a severe electrical storm the night before. The
body was found lying with the lower portion in water; in
the same puddle approximately six feet from the body was an
electric cord, attached to a sump pump used to fill the boiler.
There was no switch on the pump; the pump was started by
plugging the cord into the electric socket, and stopped by
removing the plug. The claimant's theory, based on the
position of the body relative to the cord, was that the decedent
had died from electrocution in pulling out the cord, thus
making the death the result of employment. Defendant
20. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 320 (1954).
21. 232 S. C. 185, 101 S. E. 2d 494 (1957).
22. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 320, p. 681 (1954).

23. 238 S. C. 431, 120 S. E. 2d 398 (1961).
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claimed that death resulted from a coronary from a preexisting heart condition. This type of case, often involving
night watchmen or police, presents a particularly difficult
problem of proof both for claimant and defense, since there
are seldom any eye-witnesses, the after-discovered facts are
sparse, and recreation of the event involves hypotheses and
imagination. Under South Carolina law, the burden is on the
claimant to produce evidence as will render the claim compensable, and a decision cannot rest upon "surmise, conjecture
or speculation." Courts frequently hold that evidence such
as that indicated above is insufficient to justify a finding in
the proponent's favor, and a finding of fact based thereon
must be set aside as pure speculation. 24 However, claimant
herein relied further on the "natural presumption, or ....
presumption of fact, that one charged with the performance
of a duty,' and injured while performing such duty, or found
injured where his duty required him to be, is injured in the
course of, and as a consequence of, his employment." If
the basic facts giving rise to the presumption are found to
exist, then the presumption arises, and at least takes the
case to the trier of fact.25 The Supreme Court held, per the
Chief Justice, that the presumption could not be used to
establish the incidence of the accident in the instant case, and
affirmed the trial court's reversal of the order for compensation rendered by the Industrial Commission. It would
seem that the holding of the Court is that the basic facts
were not sufficient to establish the presumption, since no
evidence was available to indicate that the claimant died of
electrocution, other than the position of the cord. Support
for this interpretation of the opinion is found in the emphasis
placed by Chief Justice Taylor on the fact that the deceased
had no duty in any wise connected with the operation of the
sump pump; someone else had that duty. Nor was there any
evidence that the loose cord had been plugged into the socket.
24. Judicial struggles with this problem are indicated in four cases

collected or cited in Dean McCormick's casebook, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF EVMIENCE, pp. 597-599 (1956). The cases are Burens v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 549, 124 N. E. 2d 724 (1955);
Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mlass. 469, 58 N. E. 2d 754 (1945);
Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 35 (1944); and Evans
& Co. v. Astley, [19111 A. C. 674, 678, opinion of Earl Loreburn. L. C.
25. MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 310 (1954) ; Battey, Some Problems of

Presumptions: The South Carolina Treatment, 14 S. C. L. Q. 538, 543551 (1962).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

7

19621

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 11
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

Burden of Persuasion-CriminalCases
In State v. Young, 26 defendant claimed error in the instructions to the jury in that the jury might have been led
to believe that the burden of proof could shift to the defendant. The portion of the charge objected to stated :26a
The burden of proof is upon the State to prove the guilt
and it does not shift to this defendant in this case except
upon any testimony which may relate to the defense of
insanity and then the burden shifts to him to prove by
the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence the
fact of insanity because that rests upon the defendant.
The Supreme Court held this charge to be free from error,
especially since the trial judge on nine occasions made reference to the requirement that the State must prove the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, before defendant could be convicted as charged. The instruction as to
the shifting of the burden clearly related only to the issue
of insanity, as to which issue such instruction was proper.
Presumptions
In Mungo v. Bennett,27 the Court applied the rule that no
presumption exists that all domestic animals are dangerous.
Hence, a plaintiff claiming damages for being kicked by
defendant's horse must prove that defendant had reason to
know that the animal was dangerous.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

In State v. Worthy28 the confessions made by the defendant
were recorded at the time on electric recording devices. At
the trial, the confessions were admitted through the oral
testimony of officers present at the time of taking. The
defendant objected on appeal that the oral testimony was
not the "best evidence," and that the recorded confessions
must be offered or their absence excused. The Supreme Court
held the oral testimony admissible, Mr. Justice Moss saying :29
It was competent to prove the confessions by the oral
testimony of the officers who heard such, even though
26. Supra note 16.
26a. 238 S. C. 137, 119 S. E. 2d 516 (1961).

27. 238 S. C. 79, 119 S. E. 2d 522 (1961).
28. Supra note 15.

29. 239 S. C. 462, 123 S4 E. 2d 841-842 (1962).
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a recording thereof was made. In this connection, we
should point out that the tape recordings of the confessions of the appellant had been made available to his
counsel. There is no showing that the contents of the
recordings were any different from the oral testimony of
the officers who heard the confessions. If there was a
difference, the recordings could have been used for the
purpose of impeaching these witnesses.
The Court approves the view adopted in some jurisdictions
that the recording or the oral testimony relating to the
statements made are equally competent primary evidence.
Thus presumably had the recordings been destroyed, the oral
testimony would have been admissible. This is in accord with
the view of Dean McCormick in regard to analagous situations, when he says :30
In other words, the transactions described are not regarded by the law as essentially written transactions,
as are written contracts, deeds, and judgments. Where
this is so, testimony descriptive of such oral transactions
is not within the scope of the present rule [the Best
Evidence rule], and it may be given without the use or
production of the written memorandum.
The question might arise where the original tape recording
has been reduced to typewritten copy; in this situation, Professor Conrad has concluded that the only safe course for
the typed
counsel is to. preserve both the tape recording and
3
transcript thereof, and to offer both in evidence. .
OPINION EVIDENCE

In State v. Sharpe3 2 defendant was charged with assault
with intent to ravish. Prior to trial, he moved for an order
to have himself confined to the State Hospital for 30 days
for examination and observation as to his sanity, 33 which
motion was denied. At the trial, the solicitor introduced
evidence of the sheriff and a deputy sheriff, and of the chief
of police of the city, each of whom testified to the opinion
that defendant knew the difference between right and wrong.
30. McCoRMIIC ON EVIDENCE, § 198 (1954).

31. Edwin C. Conrad, Magnetic Recordings in the Courts, 40 VA. L. Rzv.
23, 28-36 (1954).
32. Supra note 4.
33. Pursuant to CODE OF LAWS OF SoTHrrE ZAROLINA, § 32-966 (1952),

and § 32-927, 1960 Supp.
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A Dr. Keyserling had examined the defendant in the early
hours of the morning after the alleged commission of the
crime, and a portion of his written statement was read into
the record. 34 This included statements that the defendant
seemed a well oriented individual, did not appear intoxicated,
and seemed perfectly capable of understanding the purpose
of his examination. Defendant called as a witness a Dr.
Morse, a general practitioner, who had never examined
defendant and who testified in answer to a hypothetical question. He testified that he was not in a position to know
whether defendant knew the difference between right and
wrong. The Supreme Court held that the granting or denial
of the motion to commit was within the sound discretion of the
trial judge, and that no abuse of discretion appeared. The
lay testimony as to sanity was held properly admissible.
In State v. Thorne,35 also a rape case, defendant was committed to the State Hospital before trial for 30 days examination,
pursuant to the statute, and the examining physicians testified
that in their opinion he was able to distinguish right from
wrong. No testimony was presented that the defendant was
insane or mentally defective.
In McCarty v. Kendall Company,3 6 a workmen's compensation proceeding, the question was whether there existed a
causal connection between the back injury of the employee
and the later formation of a kidney stone. Defendant objected
that a hypothetical question asked an expert physician, witness for the plaintiff, included facts not supported in the
evidence. The Supreme Court noted that "[Ilt is quite true
that the probative value of expert testimony based upon
hypothetical facts stands or falls with the existence of facts
upon which it is predicated." But the Court found that there
was evidence in the record to permit the finder of fact to find
in accordance with the factual premise of the hypothetical
question.
RELEVANCY

Demonstrative Evidence
Two questions relating to demonstrative evidence arose in
the case of Harper v. Bolton.37 Plaintiff suffered an injury
34. The opinion does not indicate whether an objection was made to
this evidence on the ground that it was hearsay.

35. 239 S. C. 164, 121 S. E. 2d 623 (1961).
36. 238 S. C. 493, 120 S. E. 2d 860 (1961).
37. 239 S. C. 541, 124 S. E. 2d 54 (1962).
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to her left eye, necessitating its removal, in the accident in
which she was riding as a passenger in defendant's automobile. At the trial, the surgeon who removed the eye testified
to the condition of the eye after the accident, the need to
remove it, and the operation resulting in its removal. Counsel
then asked, "Incidentally, do you happen to have the eye?" 38
The doctor handed counsel a small glass vial containing the
removed eye, which counsel offered in evidence. Defendant
objected that the eye was irrelevant, since it had already
been established by the doctor's testimony that the eye had
been removed. The trial court asked counsel to admit that
the eye had been removed, and was apparently dissatisfied
with counsel's statement of the admission,3 9 and held the eye
admissible. On appeal, the points were carefully briefed by
counsel, and both the opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice
Moss and the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Bussey are
excellent in reasoning and analysis. The majority held that
admission of the eye under the circumstances was prejudicial
error, since the offer of evidence did not tend to shed any light
upon any issue in the case, and was apparently designed
merely to excite pity and commiseration. The Court found
the admission of defense counsel as to the loss of the eye
an unqualified admission. In dissent, Justice Bussey stressed
that the pleadings of defendant demanded strict proof of the
damages, that no objection was made until the eye was
offered in evidence, and that the admission of counsel was
qualified. Further, Justice Bussey argued that both on the
issue of admission of the eye, and on the other issue discussed
immediately below, appellant had the burden of showing that
any error was prejudicial. Yet appellant did not claim that
the verdict was excessive nor that it was unsupported by the
testimony.
The majority and dissent agree on the basic approach to
the problem. Demonstrative evidence is admissible only if it
tends to prove some disputed or controverted issue in the
38. Transcript of Record, p. 12.
39. Part of the exchange between counsel and court as indicated in
Transcript of Record, p. 13, was as follows:
"The Court: I will overrule the objection, unless Counsel -

"Air. Dallis (for the plaintiff): I will withdraw it.
"The Court: Do you admit in open Court that the eye was removed?
"Mr. Nelson (for the defendant): From what the doctor has said, I
don't think there can be any doubt about it.
"The Court: No, sir, I asked you if you admit that.
"1r. Nelson: If the doctor testified to that, I do admit it.
"The Court: We will receive the eye in evidence."
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case. Even then, it will be excluded where the prejudicial
effect of the evidence is great and its probative value is
slight. In the view of the majority of the Court, once the
doctor testified that the eye had been removed, and especially
since counsel made the concession that there was no question
as to the eye's removal, the introduction into evidence of the
eye had little probative value and considerable prejudicial
possibility. The record on appeal is not clear as to whether
plaintiff in any way demonstrated her injuries to the jury; if
she had done so, then the argument that the eye itself was
merely cumulative and possibly prejudicial evidence on the
issue of the removal of the eye would be strengthened.
The other issue involved in the case arose from the use of
the blackboard by counsel for plaintiff during his argument
to the jury. He was permitted to endorse thereon his personal
opinion as to the per diem value of the pain and suffering
undergone by plaintiff. It would appear that the issue here
is whether counsel can express in dollar amounts his opinion
of the compensable value of pain and suffering; the use of
the blackboard as an aid does not add anything to the problem.
Presumably, if counsel can give his estimate of pain and
suffering damages orally, he can do it using a blackboard.
The majority held that damages for pain and suffering, being
unliquidated and indeterminate, must rest in the sound discretion of the jury, subject to the ambit of the trial judge's
control for excessiveness. The Court found that there was
no evidence in the record to support counsel's estimates of per
diem damages for pain and suffering. Justice Bussey, dissenting on this issue as well, argued that counsel could
legitimately make reasoned inferences from the evidence,
including his own judgment as to the amount of damage, in
gross or in detail. The rule adopted by the majority, Justice
Bussey argued, would substantially inhibit many counsel in
adequately presenting their cases to the jury.
In the Thorne case4" the solicitor offered in evidence during
cross-examination of defendant's sister a photograph of defendant taken while he was posing stripped to the waist and
flexing his muscles. The witness was asked, "Does that look
like your brother about three years ago? A. Yeah." 4 ' Defendant objected on the ground that it was calculated to
40. Supra note 35.

41. 239 S. C. 167, 121 S. E. 2d 624 (1961).
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inflame the jury, and that since defendant was present at the
trial, whatever probative value the photograph might have
was supplied by the juri's opportunity to observe the defendant. The Court admitted the photograph into evidence.
The Supreme Court, per the Chief Justice, affirmed, noting
that defendant had been in prison for two years in connection
with his trial, and the evidence showed that he had lost
weight during this time. The victim was a sixteen year old
girl of approximately 95 pounds weight; the State wished to
reveal that the defendant at the time of the alleged offense
was a strongly developed young man weighing between 185
and 200 pounds. This weighing of probative value against
possible prejudicial effect is also illustrated in the Sharpe
case 42 in which a handkerchief with blood stains almost
indiscernable to the naked eye was admitted in evidence.
The testimony showed that the defendant had worn a handkerchief over his face when he came into the home of the
prosecuting witness, and the State alleged that this was the
handkerchief in question. The Court held that the evidence
tended to corroborate the testimony of the prosecuting witness, and was not calculated to arouse the sympathies and
prejudice of the jury.
Other Transactions or Occurrences
In Davis43 the confession of defendant contained statements
relative to independent offenses committed in Atlanta. The
Court held that this portion of the confession should be
deleted on the re-trial of the case, since intercourse was
admitted, identity was not in issue, and the only issue was
consent. Evidence disclosing a previous offense was held
admissible within the Lyle-4 4Molineux 45 rule, in State v.
S1hcarpe.46 A police officer testified that the defendant told
him that he went to the house:
to get revenge on the woman that testified against him
in a previous case that caused him to have to serve eight
months on the Chain Gang . . . . He then saw that
it was not the woman who had testified against him
so I asked him well, Israel, why didn't you leave the
42. Supra note 4.
43. Supra note 3.
44. State v. Lyle, 125 S. C. 406, 118 S. E. 803 (1923).
45. People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901).
46. Supra note 4.
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house, and he said at that time it didn't make no difference, he said I was going to rape anybody that would
47
have been there.
Testimony was presented proving that the woman who had
testified against him in the previous trial had formerly lived
in the same house. The Court held this testimony within the
Lyle exception as showing motive, intent and identity.
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION

Preservation of Exceptions
In the Worthy case 4s no "best evidence" objection was made
to the oral testimony regarding confessions offered by the
State, but the Court considered the exception anyway, under
its "in favorem vitae" rule in capital cases. Similarly in
Sharpe49 the Court considered many errors to which objection
was not made at the trial. However, counsel for defendant in
such a case cannot safely neglect to take appropriate objections
to inadmissible or prejudicial testimony offered by the solicitor, hoping that the in favorem vitae rule will preserve all
questions on appeal. State v. Robinson50 indicates the limitations on the rule; in that case, the solicitor asked the deputy
sheriff who had arrested the defendant if the defendant had
tried to run at the time. The sheriff made a non-responsive
answer which included the statement that defendant had said
he was "going to the probation office." Defendant made no
objection to this at the trial, but on appeal argued that this
introduced inadmissible evidence that defendant had been
convicted of another crime, unrelated to that before the court.
The Supreme Court held that to constitute reversible error,
the appellant had the burden of satisfying the Court that the
admission of such testimony was prejudicial. The fact that
counsel had made no objection gave some indication that he
did not think the answer prejudicial to his client.
In Garrett v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of N. J.rl defendant requested a charge of the trial court, which was
refused. His request was based on alleged improper argument
of counsel for plaintiff earlier in the case. No timely objection
had been made to such argument, nor was the nature of the
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

239 S. C. 272, 122 S. E. 2d 629 (1961).
Supra note 15.
Supra note 4.
Supra note 17.
239 S. C. 574, 124 S. E. 2d 36 (1962).
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argument set out in the record of the case. Because of the
failure to preserve the question in the record, the Supreme
Court held that it could not be considered on appeal.
Multiple Admissibility
Frequently in a lawsuit evidence is offered which is relevant
to two or more issues in the case, and which is unobjectionable
if it had been offered only on one of these issues, but is incompetent if offered on the other. 52 The usual solution of
this problem is to admit the evidence, instructing the jury
that it is admitted only on the issue on which it is competent,
and should not be considered by them on the other issue.
Thus in South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.5. 3
the trial court held inadmissible a letter and memorandum
relating to the insurance policy which the electric company
had with Lloyd's of London. The action at bar concerned
another policy which the electric company had with Aetna.
The electric company had already collected on its Lloyd's
policy for the same loss. There was also offered in evidence,
however, the Lloyd's policy itself and the loan receipt given
in connection with Lloyd's payment to the electric company
under that policy. The trial judge ruled that the policy and
loan receipt were admissible against the electric company on
the issue whether there had been an "ensuing fire" within
the terms of the Aetna policy, but not admissible on whether
there was liability between Lloyd's and the electric company.
The issue of "ensuing fire" was an issue in the case, and
the Court viewed the policy and receipt as admissions on
this issue; the issue of liability between Lloyd's and the
electric company was foreign to the instant case. Since the
electric company was not appealing, the question of the
propriety of admitting the policy and receipt was not raised
on appeal, but presumably, with the limiting instruction as
given, the admission was correct.
4 involved two automobile accidents
Matthews v. Porter5
in succession. At both times, defendant's wife was with him
when his car was hit, yet the defendant did not call his wife
as a witness. This would raise the permissible inference that

52. Watson v. Wall, supra note 1, is an application of this doctrine in

addition to the cases discussed herein. Generally, see McCoRMICX ON
EVIENCE), § 59 (1954)
53. 238 S. C. 248, 120 S. E. 2d 111 (1961).
04. 239 S. C. 620, 124 S. E. 2d 321 (1962).
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his wife's testimony would be damaging to his case;5 hence
to explain his wife's absence as a witness, defendant testified
that she was asleep when the first collision occurred, and
lying across the seat of the car being attended by a doctor
at the time of the second collision. On cross-examination,
counsel for plaintiff asked if the wife had not made a claim
against the defendant for her injuries. The trial court after
discussion out of the presence of the jury permitted counsel
to ask this question, over the objection of the defendant that
this created an inference that the defendant was insured.
The court specifically ruled that while this question could be
asked, counsel could not question with reference to insurance.
The Supreme Court held that the question was proper as
tending to show another reason for the absence of the wife
than the reason given by the defendant, and stated that it
did not think that the testimony created an inference that
the defendant had liability insurance. The question would
seem proper under the usual rule of multiple admissibility
even if it did create such an inference, with the defendant
being entitled to a restrictive instruction to the effect that
the jury could use the testimony only in rebuttal of the explanation of the wife's absence as a witness.5 6
MISCELLANEOUS

Improper Argument
57

In State v. Davis defendant, a white member of the United
States Marine Corps, was charged with the rape of a Negro
woman. At the same term of court, a Negro man was charged
with the rape of a white woman. 58 Defendant Davis was
tried on the opening day of the term, the Negro, Sharpe, on
the second day. Both were found guilty and sentenced to
death. In his closing argument to the jury in the trial of
defendant, the solicitor made the following argument:rO
I have one or more similar cases to the one being tried,
to be brought up later in this court, and if you turn this
defendant loose you might as well be turning these other
defendants loose also, because if you turn this man loose
I'm going to turn the others loose.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

MCCORMICK oN EVIDENCE, § 249 (1954).
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 168 (1954).
Supra note 3.
State v. Sharpe, supra note 4.
239 S. C. 283, 122 S. E. 2d 635 (1961).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/11

16

SOUTH CAROLINA
LAWEvidence
REVIEW
Randall:

[Vol. 15

Both trials had received widespread newspaper treatment,
and there was wide public interest therein. Defendant's counsel did not move for a mistrial, but did make an objection to
"this line of talk," and the trial judge admonished the jury
to try the case on the evidence adduced, and that no other
case had anything to do with this case. The Supreme Court
expressed doubt that "the evil influence upon the jury of
the solicitor's argument was dispelled by so weak a protest and
by such mild judicial action." 60 The Court reversed the conviction.
Leading Questions
Objection was made on appeal to many leading questions
asked the prosecuting witness in the Davis case. 61 Timely objection had not been made thereto, but the Supreme Court
considered the question nonetheless. However, the Court
indicated that the failure of counsel to object at the time
suggested that he did not think the questions prejudicial to
his client. Furthermore, the Court suggested, permitting
such questions was largely within the discretion of the trial
judge, and that the witness was "ignorant, illiterate, and
under nervous strain."6 12
Sequestration of Witnesses
In Sharpe,6 3 the trial judge granted the motion of defendant
to sequestrate all witnesses, save the sheriff, who was permitted to remain in the courtroom for the purpose of assisting
the solicitor. The Supreme Court noted that sequestration was
largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and that he
had authority to exempt particular witnesses from the
64
operation of the order of sequestration.
Order of Proof
In Turner v. Pilot Life Insurance Company65 the theory of
the plaintiff was that the death of deceased was accidental;
the insurance company claimed deceased had committed suicide. Defendant offered evidence in proof of the defense of
suicide, to show that deceased was in bad financial condition,
was hard put to pay the premiums on his policies, carried
more insurance than a man in his financial condition would
60. 239 S. C. 284, 122 S. E. 2d 635 (1961).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Supra note 3.

MCCOlmICK oN EVIDENCE,

§

6, note 9.

Supra note 4.
239 S. C. 285, 122 S. E. 2d 636 (1961).
238 S. C.387, 120 S. E. 2d 222 (1961).
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normally carry, was short in his accounts as treasurer of his
union, and was well versed in handling firearms. The trial
court held this evidence inadmissible until defendant proved
some circumstances surrounding the death to indicate the
possibility of suicide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the offered evidence of motive would not alone suffice to
warrant submission of the issue of suicide to the jury. Hence
the trial judge was within his discretion in controlling the
order of proof to refuse to admit the testimony until a
foundation had been established.
Prejudice in Instructions to Jury
In State v. Young60 defendant was tried and convicted of
murder. He contended that another person was present and
actually struck the fatal blow. The trial judge charged that
"all persons who are present, concurring and participating by
some overt act in any crime are principals therein," and
continued :67
One who is present, helping, aiding and abetting another
or others in the execution of an agreement between them
with a common purpose to commit a crime would be
responsible for the act of any one of the party provided
that such act was done pursuant and incidental to such
common purpose. Just to illustrate, gentlemen, I happened to be looking last night at a comedy on television
where the Kingfish and Andy, I believe, were trying to
get out of the telephone slot an old nickel. Well, I believe,
the Kingfish was outside the telephone booth and Andy
was inside the telephone booth. The Kingfish was watching, the other was trying to get the nickel out. Well, the
mere fact that the one on the outside was not inside
would make no difference in their degree of guilt because
in such an instance the act of one would be the act of
both if it was in the minds of both when they went there
to get the nickel. So that's what the law means by saying
that when two or more parties are engaged in the commission of a crime, the one watches, the other shoots,
the law says it makes no difference who fired the fatal
shot.
The Supreme Court held that in the circumstances, where defendant himself asserted that another person was present and
66. Supra note 16.
67. 238 S. C. 127, 119 S. E. 2d 510 (1961).
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struck the fatal blow, the comment was not prejudicial and
0
did not amount to an improper comment on the evidence.
Judicial Notice
Acting Associate Justice Steve C. Griffith speaking for the
Supreme Court found himself dissenting from the views of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky as to what constitutes common
knowledge and experience of the characteristics of horses and
mules and the methods of working such animals, in Mungo v.
Bennett.00 Plaintiff, a neighbor of defendant, had been called
to defendant's back yard, where he found defendant currying
his horse. Plaintiff's evidence showed that defendant knew that
the horse had on previous occasions been vicious, and had not
warned plaintiff of such trait. While plaintiff was standing
about five feet from the right front shoulder of the animal,
it whirled around suddenly and kicked him. Defendant claimed
that the plaintiff should be found contributorily negligent as
a matter of law, based on common knowledge of the propensity
of such animals to kick. The Court refused to so hold, distinguishing cases holding that walking directly behind the
heels of the animal constituted contributory negligence, since
in the instant case, plaintiff was not behind the animal at
all. However, Justice Griffith disagreed with the view of
those cases which stated that domestic animals were likely as
a matter of common knowledge to kick at any time. He stated
his experience that a properly trained animal does not kick,
and that as a matter of common knowledge, you cannot work
such an animal without going within radius of his heels.
In Jumper v. Goodwino the Court stated that it is common
knowledge that in open country where the speed limit is 55
miles per hour, there are many unmarked, small dirt roads
intersecting with the improved highways.
'08. Brief of Appellant-Defendant argued, pp. 12-13: "So closely does
th illustration conform to the facts in this case, insofar as the larceny
i3 concerned, the charge was therefore, at one and the same time, a charge
on the facts and an opinion by the Trial Judge, that regardless of defendant's plea of not having actually killed anyone, he was automatically
guilty of that offense. Thus, also, by charging as he did 'the law says
it makes no difference who fired the shot,' the Trial Judge was not only
giv:ng his opinion as to the defendant's testimony, but was to all practical
pu, poses directing a verdict of 'guilty of murder ....
S. ... The defendant, under the most favorable consideration of the
facts stood literally between 'Life and Death.' This serious aspect, it is
submitted, was wrecked by holding up, as a guide and standard by which
his testimony, his chief defense, was to be gauged, a comic situation ....
69. Supra note 27.
70. 239 S. C. 508, 123 S. E. 2d 857 (1962).
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"Bound By Own Witness"
In Rakestraw v. Allstate Insurance Company71 an insurance
:policy issued by defendant provided for payment of medical
expenses to any person who sustained bodily injury caused by
.accident while occupying the insured's automobile "with the
permission of the owner." Defendant denied that permission
had been given by the insured to the plaintiff. It appeared
that the car had been left with the owner of a filling station
.solely for purpose of sale by him. Plaintiff obtained the car
from the filling station owner in order to paint it. Plaintiff
,called as a witness the owner of the filling station, one
XMcKinney, who testified that he told plaintiff to paint the
car, and not to use it for his own personal use, but to take
it directly to his home, where the work was to be done, and
bring it back on the following Monday. The accident occurred,
according to plaintiff's testimony, on Sunday while plaintiff
was taking his wife to her mother's home. Plaintiff had a
collision with a train. The Supreme Court held that as a
-natter of substantive insurance law, the clause in the policy
-should not be extended beyond its plain meaning. Since
McKinney was called as a witness for the plaintiff, and since
his testimony was clear that no permission existed, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff was bound by McKinney's
testimony. Plaintiff was free to introduce any evidence he
might have to prove the facts were other than as McKinney
testified, but plaintiff failed to introduce any controverting
testimony.
The conclusion of the Supreme Court that on the record
as viewed from the substantive insurance law as laid down
by the Court, plaintiff failed to discharge his burden of
'producing evidence that he was occupying the car with the
permission of the insured, is undoubtedly sound. It is doubtful whether anything helpful is added by stating that "plaintiff is bound by the testimony of his own witness." Such
statements, as the Court points out, have caused confusion
in the area of their most common applicability, the right of
;a party to impeach his own witness.72
71. 238 S. C. 217, 119 S. E. 2d 746 (1961).
72. Where the party himself testifies on the trial, is his testimony con,elusive against himself? Dean McCormick's discussion of this problem is
illuminating, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 243 (1954). The instant case,
where a witness for the party testifies, does not involve the same problem;
such testimony could hardly be called a formal admission by the party.
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